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The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the performance of market advisory services for the 1995-
2000 corn and soybean crops.  A new database from the Agricultural Market Advisory Services 
(AgMAS) Project is used in the evaluation.  This database should not be subject to survivorship and 
hindsight biases.  Overall, the results provide limited evidence that advisory programs as a group 
outperform market benchmarks, particularly after considering risk.  In contrast, some evidence exists that 
advisory programs as a group outperform the farmer benchmark, even after taking risk into account.  
There is little evidence that advisory programs with superior performance can be usefully selected based 
on past performance. 
 
 















 The Performance of Agricultural Market Advisory Services 
in Corn and Soybeans 
 
 
  For a subscription fee, agricultural market advisory services provide specific pricing advice to 
farmers, such as when and what amount to hedge in the futures market or sell in the cash market.
1 
Advisory services frequently assert that farmers sell two-thirds of their crops in the bottom one-third of 
the seasonal price range, but with the assistance and guidance a service provides, farmers can 
substantially improve marketing performance.
2  Numerous surveys show that farmers view market 
advisory services as an important tool in managing price and income risk (e.g., Sogn and Kraner; Smith, 
1989; Patrick, Musser and Eckman).  Furthermore, Davis and Patrick find that the use of market advisory 
services has a significant influence on the use of forward pricing by farmers. 
  Given the important role that advisory services play in farm marketing, it is somewhat surprising 
that only two previous academic studies investigate whether the performance claims of market advisory 
services are true (Gehrt and Good; Martines-Filho).
3  The results generally suggest that corn and soybean 
farmers can obtain a higher price by following the marketing recommendations of advisory services.  
While a useful starting point, these studies have important limitations.  First, the cross-section of advisory 
services tracked for each crop year is quite small, with the largest sample including only six advisory 
services.  Second, the results may be subject to survivorship bias, a consequence of tracking only advisory 
services that remain in business at the end of a sample period.  The literature on the performance of 
mutual funds, hedge funds and commodity trading advisors provides ample evidence of the upward bias 
in performance results that can result from survivorship bias (e.g., Brown, Goetzmann, Ibbotson and 
Ross; McCarthy, Schneeweis and Spurgin; Brown, Goetzmann and Ibbotson).  Third, the results may be 
subject to hindsight bias because advisory service recommendations are not collected on a “real-time” 
basis (Jaffe and Mahoney).  Hindsight bias is the tendency to collect or record profitable 
recommendations and ignore or minimize unprofitable recommendations after the fact.    2
  This discussion highlights the need for further research on the performance of agricultural market 
advisory services.  In particular, much larger samples of advisory services are needed and databases 
should be more carefully constructed to avoid survivorship and hindsight biases.  The purpose of this 
paper is to evaluate the pricing performance of market advisory services in corn and soybeans using a 
new database available from the Agricultural Market Advisory Services (AgMAS) Project at the 
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.  Data for no fewer than 23 market advisory services are 
available for each crop year over 1995-2000.
4  While the sample of advisory services is non-random, it is 
constructed to be generally representative of the majority of advisory services offered to farmers.  Further, 
the sample of advisory services includes all programs tracked by the AgMAS Project over the study 
period, so pricing performance results should not be plagued by survivorship bias.  The AgMAS Project 
subscribes to all of the services that are followed and records recommendations on a real-time basis.  This 
should prevent the pricing performance results from being subject to hindsight bias. 
  Following the literature on mutual fund and investment newsletter performance (e.g., Metrick; 
Jaffe and Mahoney), two basic questions will be addressed in the paper: 1) Do market advisory services, 
on average, outperform appropriate benchmarks? and 2) Do market advisory services exhibit persistence 
in their performance from year-to-year?  Explicit marketing assumptions are made to produce a consistent 
and comparable set of results across different advisory programs.  Based on these assumptions, the net 
price received by a subscriber to a market advisory program is calculated for the 1995-2000 corn and 
soybean crops.  The first performance test compares the average price of advisory programs and 
benchmarks.  The second compares both the average price and risk of advisory programs and 
benchmarks.  The third evaluates the predictability of advisory program performance from year-to-year.  
Both market and farmer benchmarks are developed for the evaluations.  The benchmarks are computed 
using the same assumptions as those applied to advisory service track records.   3
 
Market Advisory Service Recommendations 
The AgMAS Project was initiated in 1994 with the goal of providing unbiased and rigorous 
evaluation of market advisory services.  Five criteria have been used to determine which advisory services 
are included in the AgMAS study.  First, marketing recommendations from an advisory service must be 
received electronically in real time.  Second, a service has to provide marketing recommendations to 
farmers rather than (or in addition to) speculators or “traders.”  Third, marketing recommendations from 
an advisory service must be in a form suitable for application to a representative farmer.  That is, the 
recommendations have to specify the percentage of the crop involved in each transaction ---cash, futures 
or options--- and the price or date at which each transaction is to be implemented.  Fourth, advisory 
services must provide “blanket” or “one-size fits all” marketing recommendations so there is no 
uncertainty about implementation.  Fifth, a candidate service must be a viable, commercial business.   
Three forms of survivorship bias may be potential problems when assembling an advisory 
program database.  The first and most direct form of survivorship bias occurs if only advisory programs 
that remain in business at the end of a given sample period are included in the sample.  This form of bias 
should not be present in the AgMAS database of advisory programs because all programs that have been 
tracked over the entire time period of the study are included in the sample.  The second form of 
survivorship bias occurs if discontinued advisory programs are deleted from the sample for the year when 
they are discontinued.  This is a form of survivorship bias because only survivors for the full crop year are 
tracked.  The AgMAS database of advisory programs should not be subject to this form of bias because 
programs discontinued during a crop year remain in the sample for that crop year.  Cash positions 
remaining after the date of discontinuation are sold using the same strategy as the market benchmarks 
utilized for this study.  The third and most subtle form of survivorship bias occurs if data from prior 
periods are "back-filled" at the point in time when an advisory program is added to the database.  This is a 
form of survivorship bias because data from surviving advisory programs are back-filled.  The AgMAS   4
database should not be subject to this form of bias because recommendations are not back-filled when an 
advisory program is added.  Instead, recommendations are collected only for the crop year after a decision 
has been made to add an advisory program to the database.  
The AgMAS Project subscribes to all of the services that are followed and records 
recommendations on a real-time basis, and therefore, the database of recommendations should not be 
subject to hindsight bias.  The information is received electronically, via satellite transmission, website or 
e-mail.  For the programs that provide multiple daily updates, typically in the morning and at noon, 
information is recorded for all updates.  In this way, the actions of a farmer-subscriber are simulated in 
real-time.  The final set of recommendations attributed to each advisory program represents the best 
efforts of the AgMAS Project staff to accurately and fairly interpret the information made available by 
each advisory program.  In cases where a recommendation is considered vague or unclear, some judgment 
is exercised as to whether or not to include that particular recommendation.  This occurs most often when 
a program suggests that “a farmer might consider” a position, or when minimal guidance is given as to the 
quantity to be bought or sold.  Given that some recommendations are subject to interpretation, the 
possibility is acknowledged that the AgMAS track record of recommendations for a given program may 
differ from that stated by the advisory program, or from that recorded by another subscriber.
5   
Advisory programs employ a diverse set of futures, options and cash positions (Bertoli et al.).  
These must be weighted in some manner before valid comparisons can be made.  Since the price exposure 
of a portfolio of positions is a weighted-average of the price exposures of the individual positions, where 
the weights are the deltas of the individual positions (Hull), “marketing profiles” can be constructed that 
are comparable across programs.
6  More specifically, a marketing profile shows the net amount priced 
(sold) by an advisory program, on a cumulative basis, each day over the marketing window.  Two 
marketing profile examples in corn for the 2000 crop year are presented in Figure 1.
7  These profiles 
nicely illustrate the wide range in marketing “styles” found across advisory programs.
8  The top panel 
shows a “conservative” program that engages in minimal pre-harvest pricing and makes a small number   5
of pricing transactions post-harvest.  The bottom panel shows an “aggressive” program, which in this 
example includes full to no hedging of expected production during the pre-harvest period, some periods 
where the net position is long during post-harvest (negative net amount priced) and very late sales of 
much of the cash commodity. 
The marketing profile examples suggest three interesting observations.  First, the time-series 
variation in the net amount priced (hedge ratio) often is much larger than what optimal hedging models 
typically generate (e.g., Lei, Liu and Hallam; Martines-Filho).  Second, advisory programs engage in 
what Working termed “selective” hedging strategies.  Third, a similar type of behavior has been 
frequently observed in the risk management programs of financial and non-financial corporations, where 
it is labeled “hedging with a view” (Stulz; Brown and Khokher; Brown, Crabb and Haushalter). 
 
Computing the Returns to Marketing Recommendations 
  In order to simulate a consistent and comparable set of results across different market advisory 
programs, certain explicit marketing assumptions are made.  These assumptions are intended to accurately 
depict “real-world” marketing conditions.  Several key assumptions are: i) the advice for a given crop 
year is considered to be complete for each advisory program when cumulative cash sales of the 
commodity reach 100%, all futures positions covering the crop are offset, all option positions covering 
the crop are either offset or expire, and the advisory program discontinues giving advice for that crop 
year,
  ii) with a few exceptions, the marketing window for a crop is 24 months in length and runs from 
September of the year before harvest through August after harvest, iii) cash prices and yields refer to a 
central Illinois farm, iv) commercial storage costs are charged to post-harvest sales, v) brokerage costs are 
subtracted for all futures and options transactions and vi) Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) 
marketing loan recommendations made by advisory programs are followed wherever feasible.  Based on 
these and other assumptions, a weighted-average net price is computed for each advisory program 
included in a particular crop year.  It should be interpreted as the harvest-equivalent net price received by   6
a farmer who precisely follows the marketing advice for a given program (as recorded by the AgMAS 
Project).  The price is stated on a harvest-equivalent basis because post-harvest sales are adjusted for 
physical storage and interest opportunity costs.  An example will help illustrate the computation of net 
advisory prices.  For the 2000 crop year in corn, the highest net advisory price is $2.78 per bushel, and it 
is computed as the unadjusted cash sales price ($2.05) minus commercial storage costs ($0.27) plus 
futures and options gain ($0.69) minus brokerage costs ($0.06) plus marketing loan benefits ($0.37).  The 
AgMAS research report by Irwin, Martines-Filho and Good contains complete details on assumptions and 
computation of net advisory prices. 
  Since many subscribers to market advisory services produce both corn and soybeans, it is relevant 
to examine a combined measure of corn and soybean pricing performance for each market advisory 
program.  One way to aggregate the results is to calculate the per-acre revenues implied by the pricing 
performance results.  The per-acre revenue for each commodity is found by multiplying the net advisory 
price for each market advisory service by the actual central Illinois corn or soybean yield for each year.  
A simple average of the two per acre revenues is then taken to reflect a farm that uses a 50/50 rotation of 
corn and soybeans. 
Two different types of benchmarks are used to compute the returns to the marketing advice 
provided by advisory programs.  The first class of benchmarks is based on the theory of efficient markets.  
In its strongest form, efficient market theory predicts that market prices always fully reflect available 
public and private information (Fama).  The practical implication is that no trading strategy can 
consistently beat the return offered by the market.  Hence, the return offered by the market becomes the 
relevant benchmark.  In the context of this study, a market benchmark should measure the average price 
offered by the market over the marketing window of a representative farmer who follows advisory 
program recommendations.  The average price is computed in order to reflect the returns to a naïve, “no-
information” strategy of marketing equal amounts each day during the marketing window.  The difference   7
between advisory prices and the market benchmark measures the value of advisory service information.  
The theory of efficient markets predicts this difference, on average, will equal zero.
9 
If all market participants are rational in the way efficient market theory assumes, then the only 
relevant benchmarks are market benchmarks.  However, there is growing evidence that many market 
participants may not be fully rational in the efficient market sense.  Hirshleifer provides a comprehensive 
review of the judgment and decision biases that appear to affect securities market investors.  He also 
provides an exhaustive review of empirical studies that attempt to measure the potential impact of such 
biases on securities prices and investment returns.  As an example, Barber and Odean find that individual 
stock investors under-perform the market by an average of one-and-a-half percentage points per year, an 
economically significant amount, particularly when viewed over long investment horizons.  They argue 
that a combination of overconfidence and excessive trading explains this finding.  New “behavioral” 
theories of market pricing have been developed based on the assumption that market participants are 
subject to judgment and decision biases (e.g., Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam). 
Behavioral market theory suggests that the average return actually achieved by a significant 
number of market participants may be less than that predicted by efficient market theory, due to the 
judgment and decision biases that plague these participants.  As a result, the average return actually 
received by this particular group of market participants becomes an appropriate benchmark.  In the 
context of this study, a behavioral benchmark should measure the average price actually received by 
(unadvised) farmers for a crop.  The difference between net advisory prices and a farmer benchmark 
measures the value of market advisory service information relative to the information used by farmers.  
Behavioral market theory does not predict a specific value for this difference.  It may be positive, 
negative or zero, depending on the impact of judgment and decision biases on advisory services versus 
farmers. 
  Both a 24-month and a 20-month market benchmark are specified in order to test the sensitivity of 
performance results to different market benchmarks.  The 24-month market benchmark is computed as the   8
average cash price over the entire 24-month marketing window, which begins on September 1 of the year 
prior to harvest and ends on August 31 of the year after harvest.  Cash forward contract prices for harvest 
delivery are averaged during the pre-harvest period, while spot cash prices are averaged during the post-
harvest period.  The second market benchmark is the average cash price over a 20-month window.  This 
benchmark is computed by simply deleting the first four months of the 24-month pricing-window from 
the computations of the average market price.  The farmer benchmark is based on the USDA average 
price received for the state of Illinois.  The same marketing assumptions applied to advisory service track 
records (e.g., commercial storage costs charged to post-harvest sales) are applied to the market and farmer 
benchmarks.  Again, the AgMAS research report by Irwin, Martines-Filho and Good contains complete 
details on the computation of benchmark prices and revenues. 
 
Net Advisory Prices and Benchmarks 
Descriptive statistics for net advisory prices, revenues and benchmarks for the 1995-2000 crop 
years are reported in Table 1.
10  As shown in panel A, the average advisory price for corn ranges between 
$2.02 per bushel in 1999 and $3.03 per bushel in 1995.  Minimum and maximum statistics reveal that net 
advisory prices for corn vary substantially within individual crop years.  The most dramatic example is 
1995, where the minimum is $2.29 per bushel and the maximum is $3.90 per bushel.  Even in years with 
less market price volatility, it is not unusual for the range of prices across advisory programs to be nearly 
a dollar per bushel.  The variation in benchmark prices from year-to-year is similar to that of average net 
advisory prices.  However, there can be substantial differences in benchmark prices for a particular crop 
year.  For example, the 24-month market benchmark in 1998 is $2.24 per bushel, while the farmer 
benchmark is only $1.97 per bushel.  There is some variation in the proportion of net advisory prices 
above the two market benchmarks in corn for individual crop years, particularly 1998, but the patterns are 
similar overall.  The average proportion for 1995-2000 is 51% versus the 24-month benchmark and 59% 
versus the 20-month benchmark, indicating a slight to marginal chance of advisory prices in corn   9
exceeding market benchmark prices.  In contrast, the proportion of net advisory prices above the farmer 
benchmark exceeds 50% each crop year and appears to increase somewhat over time.  The average 
proportion above the farmer benchmark over 1995-2000 is 74%.   
As shown in panel B of Table 1, the average advisory price for soybeans ranges from $5.45 per 
bushel in 2000 to $7.27 per bushel in 1996.  Similar to corn, the range of individual net advisory prices 
within a crop year is substantial.  The most dramatic example is 1999, where the range in advisory prices 
approaches $2.50 per bushel.  The variation in soybean benchmark prices from year-to-year is similar to 
that of average net advisory prices.  Once again, there can be substantial differences in benchmark prices 
for a particular crop year.  Not surprisingly then, the proportion of advisory programs above the 
benchmarks can be sharply different for individual crop years (e.g., 1998 and 1999).  The average 
proportions for 1995-2000, 61% versus the 24-month benchmark and 70% versus the 20-month 
benchmark, both indicate a better than average chance of advisory prices exceeding market benchmark 
prices in soybeans.  The proportions above the farmer benchmark are all above 50% and average 74% 
over 1995-2000, the same as for corn. 
Panel C of Table 1 contains the combined corn and soybeans revenue results.  The lowest average 
advisory revenue, $298 per acre, occurred in 2000, while the highest average advisory revenue, $369 per 
acre, occurred in 1996.  Given the results for corn and soybeans, the large range of individual advisory 
revenues within a crop year is not surprising; in three of the six crop years (1995, 1999 and 2000), the 
range exceeds $100 per acre.  Revenue proportions typically are between those of corn and soybeans, 
with an average proportion for 1995-2000 of 57% versus the 24-month benchmark and 66% versus the 
20-month benchmark.  These indicate a better than average chance of advisory revenue exceeding market 
benchmark revenue.  The proportion of advisory revenues above the farmer benchmark exceeds 50% each 
crop year and averages 77% over 1995-2000.  This indicates a sizable chance of advisory revenue 
exceeding farmer benchmark revenue.   
   10
Average Price Tests 
The performance indicator examined in this section is the average price of advisory programs 
relative to the average price associated with market and farmer benchmarks.  Given that risk is not 
considered, this indicator is strictly applicable only to farm decision-makers with risk-neutral preferences.  
While this may seem unrealistic from a theoretical perspective, there is evidence that many farmers focus 
mainly on expected returns, a point emphasized recently by Tomek and Peterson.   
A number of different statistical tests can be used to determine the significance of observed 
differences in sample means.  In the present context, it is critical to recognize that there is a “natural” 
pairing in the sample data that can be used to increase the power of statistical tests (Snedecor and 
Cochran, pp. 101).  More specifically, net advisory prices and benchmark prices for the same crop year 
are paired, in the sense that the same crop year receives different “treatments” from advisory programs 
and benchmarks.  The treatments correspond to the differing marketing strategies used by advisory 
programs and benchmarks.   
Given that the sample data are paired, the appropriate test of the null hypothesis of zero 
difference between the mean of net advisory and benchmark prices is the paired t-test.  First, define the 
following difference for a given commodity and benchmark, 
(1)  ( ) 1,..., ; 1,..., it it t rN A PB P i N t T =− = =    
where  it NAP  is the net price for the i
th advisory program in the t
th crop year and  t BP  is the benchmark 
price in the t
th crop year.  The underlying statistical model is, 
(2)  it it re β = +    
where β  is the expected value (mean) of the difference between the net price for the i
th advisory program 
and the benchmark price and  it e  is the error term for the i
th advisory program in the t
th crop year.  Note 
that the model assumes the expected value of the difference between net advisory prices and the 
benchmark is the same for all programs and crop years.  Three key assumptions typically are made about 
the error term. The first, 
2 ~( 0 ,) it i eN σ , implies that errors are normally distributed with an expected   11
value of zero and variance equal to 
2
i σ .  The second assumption, cov( , ) 0 , it is ee t s = ∀ , implies that errors 
for the same advisory program are independent through time.  The third assumption, 
cov( , ) 0 , it jt ee i j =∀, implies that errors for the same crop year are independent across advisory 
programs.  Given these assumptions, it is straightforward to test the null hypothesis of no difference in 
mean price (or revenue) for a crop year or all crop years pooled together, as a conventional t-statistic can 
be computed and used to infer the significance of observed mean differences. 
  Before conducting the statistical tests, it is important to investigate if the key assumptions 
discussed above hold for the available sample of net advisory prices and revenues.  The first assumption, 
normality, is tested via the Jarque-Bera test (Bera and Jarque, 1981, 1982).  The test statistics indicate 
normality is rejected for one crop year in corn, three crop years in soybeans and two crop years for 
revenue.
11  The rejections appear to be largely due to high kurtosis values, or “fat tails.”  Since normality 
is rejected for a moderate proportion of the six crop years, non-normality does not appear to be a serious 
problem.  Furthermore, the t-test generally is a conservative (in the sense of controlling the probability of 
Type I error) and reliable approximation in the absence of normality (Greene, p. 106).  The second 
assumption implies that advisory program differences versus a benchmark are independent across crop 
years.  The following section on predictability of performance supplies, at best, modest evidence of 
dependence through time.  So, this does not appear to be a serious statistical problem either.   
The third assumption implies that advisory program differences versus a benchmark are 
independent across programs for a given crop year.  It is difficult to provide direct evidence about this 
assumption because the sample is not large enough to independently estimate all possible pair-wise 
correlations.
12  Useful evidence can be generated by estimating “market model” regressions for each 
commodity.  This entails simply regressing net advisory prices (or revenue) for a given program on a 
market benchmark.  If net advisory prices share a common “market factor” the explanatory power of the 
regressions will be high.  In order to maximize the number of time-series observations available for each 
program, the sample for this analysis is limited to the 17 programs active in all six crop years.  The   12
explanatory power of the market model regressions turns out to be quite substantial, with an average 
2 R  
of 0.79 in corn, 0.81 in soybeans and 0.69 for revenue, and the regressions all have positive slope 
estimates.
13  These estimates are not surprising because many of the programs appear to use similar 
methods of analysis and all make heavy use of similar supply and demand information (primarily from 
the USDA).  Furthermore, alternative programs offered by the same advisory service are likely to 
generate similar pricing results.  The bottom-line is that it appears to be grossly inappropriate to assume 
that advisory program differences are independent across programs. 
The implication of incorrectly assuming independence of differences across programs is 
potentially severe.  The reliability of sample mean difference estimates is likely to be substantially 
overstated, which will in turn bias t-tests towards a conclusion that pricing performance is significantly 
positive (assuming differences are positive on average).  A similar statistical problem occurs when testing 
the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) in the stock market because stock returns tend to be positively 
correlated across stocks.  Fama and MacBeth develop a cross-sectional methodology to address this 
problem that has been applied in numerous studies of stock returns.  In the context of the present study, 
implementation of the Fama-MacBeth approach involves two steps.  The first step is to compute the 
average net advisory price across all programs active in a crop year and then subtract the benchmark price 
from this “average” advisory price.  Call this difference  i b  and repeat the computation for all six crop 
years( ) 1,...6 i = .  Since the underlying differences are assumed to be normally distributed and 
independent through time, the time-series of six  i b  will be normally distributed and independent.  As a 
result, the second step is to simply compute the usual t-statistic for the time-series of six  i b . 
The results of the average pricing test based on the Fama-MacBeth approach are found in Table 
2.  Average differences from market benchmarks for corn over 1995-2000 are small, ranging from one to 
three cents per bushel.
14  At 11¢ cents per bushel, the average difference from the farmer benchmark for 
corn is larger.  Average differences versus the market benchmarks for soybeans are larger than for corn, 
ranging from 13 to 17¢ per bushel.  The average difference versus the farmer benchmark in soybeans   13
equals 23¢ per bushel.  Average differences for 50/50 advisory revenue range from three to seven dollars 
per acre for market benchmarks over 1995-2000.  The average revenue difference versus the farmer 
benchmark is $14 per acre.  Note that the average differences can mask considerable variability across the 
benchmarks within a crop year and across crop years.  A dramatic example of this occurred in 1998 for 
soybeans, where the average difference from the 24-month market benchmark is –4¢ per bushel, while the 
average difference from the farmer benchmark is +64¢ per bushel. 
In corn, p-values for average differences versus both market benchmarks are substantially larger 
than 0.05, so it can be concluded that average differences are insignificantly different from zero.  Just the 
opposite conclusion is reached versus the farmer benchmark.  The p-value of 0.02 indicates the average 
difference of 11¢ per bushel in corn is highly significant.  Soybean results versus the market benchmarks 
are mixed, with statistical significance indicated for the average difference from the 20-month benchmark, 
but not the 24-month benchmark.  With a p-value of 0.07, the 24-month average difference just misses a 
0.05 cutoff for significance.  Like corn, the average difference of 23¢ per bushel in soybeans versus the 
farmer benchmark is significantly different from zero.  Test results for 50/50 advisory revenue follow a 
similar pattern as in soybeans.  Overall, the test results indicate no evidence of statistically significant 
average price performance in corn versus market benchmarks, mixed evidence of significant performance 
in soybeans versus market benchmarks, mixed evidence for 50/50 advisory revenue versus market 
benchmarks and consistent evidence of significant performance in corn, soybeans and 50/50 advisory 
revenue versus the farmer benchmark.
15 
An interesting issue is the source of advisory program differences from the benchmarks. 
Information in this regard is found in Table 3.  Panel A shows average net advisory prices and 
benchmarks broken out by component.  Panel B presents the average difference in the components 
between advisory programs and the benchmarks.  In cases where the average net advisory price is above 
the average benchmark price (e.g., net advisory price in corn vs. the farmer benchmark) the difference is 
primarily explained by the higher net cash sales price of advisory programs.  The average net futures and   14
options gain of advisory programs is relatively small, as is the difference in marketing loan benefits 
between advisors and the benchmarks. 
It is noteworthy that average differences versus the farmer benchmark appear to be non-trivial 
from an economic decision-making perspective.  For example, the average advisor return relative to the 
farmer benchmark, $14 per acre, is over four percent of average farmer benchmark revenue.  This 
represents a substantial increase in net farm income (defined as returns to farm operator management, 
labor and capital) in Illinois, typically about $50 per acre for grain farms (Lattz, Cagley and Raab).  The 
comparison does not account for yearly subscription costs, which average $333 per program for the 2000 
crop year, but this is not a major problem because subscription costs are quite small relative to revenue.  
For example, subscription costs are less than one-tenth of one percent of average farmer benchmark 
revenue for a 2,000 acre farm and about two-tenths of one percent for a 500 acre farm.  A more serious 
issue is fully accounting for the cost of implementing, monitoring and managing the marketing strategies 
recommended by advisory programs.  Such costs are difficult to measure, but may well be substantial 
(Tomek and Peterson).  
Finally, a systematic price pattern is present during the sample period and it is important to 
highlight possible impact this may have on the results.  More specifically, corn and soybean prices over 
the 24-month marketing window have a sharp downward price trend, with pre-harvest highs in corn and 
soybean prices averaging about 70¢ and 90¢ per bushel, respectively, higher than post-harvest lows.
16  
Any marketing strategy that systematically prices more heavily in the pre-harvest period compared to the 
post-harvest period would perform much better in this environment than a strategy that does not.  It turns 
out that advisory programs and the market benchmarks price much more heavily during the pre-harvest 
period over the 1995-2000 crop years than the farmer benchmark.  Consequently, the superior 
performance of advisory programs relative to the farmer benchmark may simply be an artifact of the 
sample period.  If advisors and farmers do not change their marketing behavior in the future and price 
trends flatten, then the superior performance of advisory programs relative to the farm benchmark could   15
disappear.  This suggests caution when considering advisory program performance results over 1995-
2000. 
 
Average Price and Risk Tests  
As noted in the previous section, average price or revenue comparisons may not provide a 
complete picture of performance.  For example, two advisory programs can generate the same average 
advisory price, but the risk of the programs may differ substantially.  The difference in risk may be the 
result of using different pricing tools (cash, forward, futures or options), different timing of sales and 
variation in the implementation of marketing strategies. 
A number of theoretical frameworks have been developed to analyze decision-making under risk.  
The mean-variance (EV) model is relatively simple and has been widely-applied in the marketing and risk 
management literature (Tomek and Peterson).  To apply the single-period EV model to a particular 
decision, either distributions of outcomes must be normal or decision-makers must have quadratic utility 
functions (Hardaker, Huirne and Anderson).  If either or both of these conditions hold, then risky choices 
can be divided into efficient and inefficient sets based on the famous EV efficiency rule:  if the mean of 
choice A is greater than or equal to the mean of choice B, and the variance of A is less than or equal to the 
variance of B, with at least one strict inequality holding, then A is preferred to B by all risk-averse 
decision makers.  Since quadratic utility has the unlikely characteristic that absolute risk aversion 
increases with the level of the outcome, application of the EV model usually is based upon an assumption 
of normally distributed outcomes.  This presents a potential problem in the case of market advisory 
programs that employ options strategies.  Such strategies are designed to create non-normal price 
distributions by truncating undesirable prices, either on the downside or the upside, or both.  Simulation 
analysis suggests that the EV model produces reasonably accurate results even in cases where options 
strategies are employed (Hanson and Ladd; Ladd and Hanson; Garcia, Adam and Hauser).   16
The basic data needed for assessing market advisory pricing performance in an EV framework are 
presented in Table 4.  For each advisory program tracked in all six crop years, the six-year average net 
advisory price or revenue and standard deviation of net advisory price or revenue are reported.
17  The 
average price and standard deviation of the three benchmarks also are reported.  The sample of advisory 
programs for the EV analysis is limited to those which are tracked all six crop years in order to maximize 
the number of observations available to estimate risk (standard deviation).
18  Even with this restriction, six 
observations would appear to be a relatively small sample for estimating the risks of market advisory 
programs.  However, Anderson explored the reliability of agricultural return-risk estimates based on 
limited data and found the surprising result that even as few as three or four observations can be very 
useful.  Nonetheless, the standard deviations reported in Table 4 may be somewhat inaccurate estimators 
of the true risks of advisory programs.  With that in mind, the standard deviations suggest that the risk of 
advisory programs varies substantially.  In corn, the standard deviations range from a low of $0.18 per 
bushel to a high of $0.67 per bushel.  In soybeans, the standard deviations range from a low of $0.35 per 
bushel to a high of $1.03 per bushel.  Finally, revenue standard deviations for the 17 programs range from 
a low of $17 per acre to a high of $43 per acre. 
Just as in the previous section, it is important to consider the level of aggregation for the EV 
analysis.  One possibility is to examine the mean and standard deviation of the “average” advisory 
program constructed for the average price tests.  Unfortunately, this is not a useful concept because the 
risk of the average program will be substantially smaller than that typically experienced by subscribers to 
individual advisory programs (due to diversification effects).  An alternative is to consider a single 
“randomly-selected” advisory program (e.g., Elton, Gruber and Rentzler).  Such a program reflects both 
the average price and average risk of individual advisory programs.  Estimates for a single randomly-
selected program can be found in Table 4 along the row labeled “Average.”  While this is a useful way to 
summarize mean-standard deviation results for advisory programs, the difficulty is that an actual time-
series of net prices (or revenues) for a randomly-selected program cannot be constructed.  This makes it   17
difficult to conduct joint statistical tests for mean-standard deviation dominance.
19  The analysis here will 
focus on individual programs so that appropriate statistical tests can be conducted.  The tradeoff is that 
aggregation of individual program test results may be problematic due to the high correlation of net prices 
across advisory programs.  This should be kept in mind when considering summary measures of the 
number of programs that dominate a particular benchmark. 
Mean-standard deviation dominance results for individual programs entail straightforward 
application of the EV efficiency rule discussed above.  Testing the statistical significance of the 
dominance results is less straightforward.  Fortunately, Bradley and Blackwood develop a simultaneous 
test of the equivalence of means and variances for paired data.  This test was first applied in the 
economics literature by Owen and Rabinovitch.  The initial step in the development of the test is to define 
the differences and sums for a given advisory program and benchmark as  tt t DN A P B P = −  and 
tt t SN A P B P =+ .  The first variable simply changes the notation used in equation (1).  Next, specify the 
following regression relationship between the differences and sums,  
(3)  12 tt t DS e β β = ++ .   
Now assume that net advisory and benchmark prices have a bi-variate normal distribution with a 
correlation coefficient between -1 and +1.  Under this assumption, Bradley and Blackwood show that, 
(4)  () ( ) ()
22 2
1 i BP i BP S i BP βµ µ σ σσ µ µ  =− − − ⋅+     
(5)  ( )
22 2
2 iB P S β σσ σ =−    
where  i µ  is the mean price for the advisory program,  BP µ  is the mean price for the benchmark, 
2
i σ  is the 
variance of the advisory program, 
2
BP σ  is the variance of the benchmark and 
2
S σ  is the variance of the 
sum of advisor and benchmark prices.  Note that  iB P µ µ =  and 
22
iB P σ σ =  if and only if  12 0 β β == .  As a 
result, the simultaneous test of the equivalence of means and variances (standard deviations) can be 
implemented in two steps.  First, run a regression of the relevant differences on the sums.  Second,   18
calculate the F-statistic for the joint null hypothesis that the intercept ( ) 1 β and slope parameters 
() 2 β equal zero and compare the test statistic to critical F-values.
20   
Mean-standard deviation dominance results for the 17 market advisory programs over 1995-2000 
are presented in Table 5.  Following the notational scheme suggested by Hardaker, Huirne and Anderson 
(p.143), a "+" indicates the average price for an advisory program is higher than the given benchmark and 
the standard deviation for the program is lower than the given benchmark.  In this case, the advisory 
program exhibits mean-standard deviation dominance of the given benchmark.  A "?" indicates the 
average price for an advisory program is higher (lower) than the given benchmark and the standard 
deviation for the program is higher (lower) than the given benchmark.  In this case, the advisory program 
does not exhibit mean-standard deviation dominance of the given benchmark, and vice versa.  A "-" 
indicates the average price for an advisory program is lower than the given benchmark and the standard 
deviation for the program is higher than the given benchmark.  In this case, the given benchmark exhibits 
mean-standard deviation dominance of the advisory program.  Based on the F-statistic from the Bradley-
Blackwood regression, two stars indicate statistically significant dominance at the one percent level and 
one star indicates statistically significant dominance at the five percent level. 
The results in Table 5 show that only 1 of the 17 advisory programs (6%) in corn dominates the 
24-month market benchmark.  Dominance in this case is not statistically significant.  Six advisory 
programs are dominated by the 24-month market benchmark, and in three cases the dominance is 
statistically significant.  Advisory programs fare somewhat better when compared to the 20-month market 
benchmark, where 6 of the 17 advisory programs dominate (35%).  Only one of these cases is statistically 
significant, however.  Advisory program performance in corn is strongest versus the farmer benchmark, 
with 10 of the 17 advisory programs dominating (59%), two in a statistically significant manner.  Only 
one program in corn is dominated by the farmer benchmark, and this is not statistically significant. 
 Similar patterns are evident for soybeans.  Only 2 of the 17 advisory programs (12%) in 
soybeans dominate the 24-month market benchmark, none of which are statistically significant.  Six   19
advisory programs are dominated by the 24-month market benchmark, but, again, none are statistically 
significant.  Advisory programs also fare somewhat better in soybeans when compared to the 20-month 
market benchmark, where 9 of the 17 advisory programs dominate (53%).  However, only one case is 
statistically significant.  Like corn, advisory program performance in soybeans is strongest versus the 
farmer benchmark, with 13 of the 17 advisory programs dominating (76%).  Two of the cases do so in a 
statistically significant manner.   
Not surprisingly, the pattern for 50/50 advisory revenue resembles that of corn and soybeans.  
Only 1 of the 17 advisory programs (6%) for revenue dominates the 24-month market benchmark, and 
this case is not statistically significant.  Eight advisory programs are dominated by the 24-month market 
benchmark, but none of these cases are statistically significant.  Seven of the 17 advisory programs (41%) 
dominate both the 20-month market benchmark and the farmer benchmark.  One case is statistically 
significant versus the 20-month benchmark and two cases are statistically significant versus the farmer 
benchmark.  No advisory program for 50/50 revenue is dominated by the 20-month market benchmark or 
the farmer benchmark. 
Overall, the test results in this section suggest little or no evidence of statistically significant 
average price and risk performance for advisory programs in corn, soybeans and 50/50 advisory revenue.  
The significance test results are consistent across the market and farmer benchmarks.  While interesting, 
these findings are not a major surprise given that statistical tests for dominance are applied to individual 
programs using only six observations.  Simple dominance counts across the programs provide additional 
and useful perspective when attempting to characterize the average price and risk performance of 
advisory programs.  Few programs (6 to 12%) dominate the 24-month market benchmark in corn, 
soybeans or 50/50 revenue.  More programs (35 to 53%) dominate the 20-month market benchmark.  In 
parallel with the average price results, the strongest evidence is found versus the farmer benchmark, 
where a relatively large number of programs (41 to 76%) dominate.  Nonetheless, one is still left with the   20




Even if, as a group, advisory programs do not tend to generate positive market returns, there is a 
wide range in performance for any given year.  This raises the important question of the predictability of 
advisory program performance from year-to-year.  Two types of predictability tests are used in the 
following analysis: i) “winner” and “loser” counts across crop years and ii) the differences between prices 
for “top” and “bottom” performing advisory programs across crop years.  The tests have been widely 
applied in studies of investment performance (e.g., Malkiel).
21  
The first test of predictability is based on placing advisory programs into “winner” and “loser” 
categories across adjacent crop years.  For a given commodity, the first step in this testing procedure is to 
form the sample of all advisory programs that are active in adjacent crop years.  The second step is to 
rank each advisory program in the first year of the pair (e.g., t = 1997) based on net advisory price.  For 
example, the program with the highest net advisory price is ranked number one, and the program with the 
lowest net advisory price is assigned a rank equal to the total number of programs for that commodity in 
the given crop year.  Then the programs are sorted in descending rank order.  The third step is to form two 
groups of programs in the first year of the pair: winners are those programs in the top half of the rankings 
and losers are programs in the bottom half.  The fourth step is to rank each advisory program in the 
second year of the pair (e.g., t +1 = 1998) based on net advisory price and once again form winner and 
loser groups of programs.  The fifth step is to compute the following counts for the advisory programs in 
the pair of crop years: winner t-winner t+1, winner t-loser t+1, loser t-winner t+1, loser t-loser t+1.  If 
advisory program performance is unpredictable, approximately the same counts will be found in each of 
the four combinations.  The appropriate statistical test in this case is Fisher’s Exact Test (Conover,   21
pp.188-189).
22  This non-parametric test is robust to outliers, which may be important when analyzing 
predictability across all advisory programs.   
Results of the winner and loser predictability test are shown in Table 6.  Winner and loser counts 
for individual crop years indicate a modest difference, at best, in the chance of a winner or loser in one 
period being a winner or loser in the subsequent period.  As an example, consider the results for corn in 
1997 and 1998.  Of the eleven winners (top half) in 1997, six are winners in 1998 and five are losers 
(bottom half).  Of the twelve losers in 1997, five are winners in 1998 and seven are losers.  In other 
words, the conditional probability of a winner from 1997 repeating in 1998 is 55% (6/11) and the 
conditional probability of a loser from 1997 repeating in 1998 is 56% (7/12).  Across all paired 
comparisons, the conditional probability of a winner repeating averages 57% and the conditional 
probability of a loser repeating averages 60%.  These probabilities are only slightly higher than what 
would result from flipping a coin (randomness).  There is only one case (50/50 revenue, 1999 vs. 2000) 
where individual year counts are significantly different from the equal distribution expected under an 
assumption of no predictability.  In sum, the results imply that the performance of winning and losing 
advisory programs is not predictable through time.
23 
While predictability may be limited or non-existent across all advisory programs, it is possible for 
sub-groups of advisory programs to exhibit predictability.  In particular, predictability may only be found 
at the extremes of performance.  That is, only top-performing programs in one year may tend to perform 
well in the next year, or only poor-performing programs may perform poorly in the next year, or both.  
This is the motivation for the second test of predictability, which is based on the difference between net 
advisory prices for top- and bottom-performing advisory programs across adjacent crop years.  For a 
given commodity, the first step in this testing procedure is to sort programs by net advisory price in the 
first year of the pair and group programs by quantiles (thirds and fourths).  The second step is to compute 
the average net advisory price for the quantiles in the second year of the pair.  Note that the same 
programs make up the quantiles in the first and second year of the pair.  For example, the average price of   22
the top fourth quantile formed in 1995 is computed for 1996.  The third step is to compute the difference 
in average price for the top- and bottom-performing quantiles.  If performance for the top- and bottom-
performing quantiles is the same, the difference will equal zero.  The appropriate statistical test in this 
case is a paired t-test of the difference in the means of the top- and bottom-performing quantiles.  There 
are a total of five comparisons (1995 vs. 1996, 1996 vs. 1997, 1997 vs. 1998, 1998 vs. 1999 and 1999 vs. 
2000), so there are four degrees of freedom for the t-test.  Since differences are computed for an 
“average” advisory program in top- and bottom-performing quantiles, dependence across individual 
advisory programs is not an issue, and p-values for the t-test are unbiased.  Carpenter and Lynch 
recommend this test because it is well-specified and among the most powerful in their comparison of 
several predictability tests for mutual funds. 
Results for the t-test of predictability are shown in Table 7.  The first column under each 
commodity heading shows the average price of the different quantiles in the first year of the comparisons 
(five in total).  The average price for the first year is “in-sample” because this is the formation year for the 
quantiles.  The second column under each heading reports the average price of the same quantiles in the 
second year of the comparisons.  The average price for the second year is “out-of-sample” because this is 
the year after formation of the quantiles.  In all cases, the average price or revenue of the top quantile 
relative to the bottom quantile declines substantially from the first to the second year of the comparisons.  
Nonetheless, the average difference between top- and bottom-performing quantiles for the second year of 
the pair is consistently positive.  For example, programs in the top third beat the bottom third in the 
second year by an average of 14¢ per bushel in corn, 29¢ per bushel in soybeans and $14 per acre for 
revenue.  Average differences are significantly different from zero for both cases in corn and 50/50 
revenue and marginally significant in soybeans.  Average prices for the top quantile out-of-sample also 
exceed benchmark prices for the same period (1996-2000).  Top third returns beat the 24-month market 
benchmark by an average of 5¢ per bushel in corn, 26¢ per bushel in soybeans and $9 per acre for 50/50   23
revenue.  Top fourth returns beat the 24-month market benchmark by an average of 9¢ per bushel in corn, 
31¢ per bushel in soybeans and $12 per acre for 50/50 revenue. 
The quantile results provide evidence that the performance of top- and bottom-performing market 
advisory programs can be predicted across adjacent crop years.  However, the evidence is not sufficient to 
conclude that performance predictability is useful from an economic standpoint, due to the overlapping 
nature of the marketing windows for each crop year.  To see the point, consider the case of a farmer who 
uses 1995 performance results to select a top-performing advisory program.  Since the 1995 marketing 
window ends on August 31, 1996, halfway through the 1996 marketing window and one day before the 
beginning of the 1997 marketing window, the farmer could not implement their selection of an advisory 
program until the 1997 crop year.  Performance would have to persist across three crop years, 1995, 1996 
and 1997, for a farmer to benefit from the predictability. 
Quantile results for non-overlapping crop years are shown in Table 8.  The testing procedure is 
the same as before, except there are only four comparisons (1995 vs. 1997, 1996 vs. 1998, 1997 vs. 1999 
and 1998 vs. 2000) and three degrees of freedom for the t-test.  The results for non-overlapping crop 
years continue to show a positive difference between top- and bottom-performing quantiles in the second 
year of the pair.  However, the magnitude of the differences is substantially smaller than in the case of 
adjacent crop years.  For example, programs in the top fourth beat the bottom fourth in the second year 
only by an average of 1¢ per bushel in corn, 14¢ per bushel in soybeans and $1 per acre for revenue.  
None of the average differences are significantly different from zero.  These results indicate predictability 
of pricing performance for top and bottom advisory programs is short-lived, in the sense that performance 
does not persist long enough to be taken advantage of by farmers.  
The predictability results presented so far are all based on individual crop year comparisons.  It is 
possible for performance to be predictable over long time horizons, but unpredictable over short horizons 
due to a large amount of “noise” in performance from year-to-year (e.g., Summers).  To assess long-term 
predictability, the sample is limited to the 17 programs active in all six crop years of the study.  Next, net   24
advisory prices are averaged for each of the 17 programs for the first three crop years of the sample 
(1995-1997) and the second three years (1998-2000).  The two tests of predictability are then applied to 
the two sets of averages.  The results are striking, in that virtually no evidence of predictability is found 
for any of the tests.  Winner-loser counts are quite close to what is expected under randomness and the 
average difference between top- and bottom-performing programs is very small (zero difference for 50/50 
advisory revenue).
24  These results occur despite the fact that the same program is ranked first in both sub-
periods for corn and 50/50 advisory revenue. 
The test results presented in this section provide little evidence that the pricing performance of 
advisory programs can be usefully predicted from past performance.  This conclusion does not mean it is 
impossible to predict advisory program performance.  There may be other variables that are useful for 
predicting performance.  Chevalier and Ellison study whether mutual fund performance is related to 
characteristics of fund managers that indicate ability, knowledge or effort, and find that managers who 
attended higher-SAT undergraduate institutions generate systematically higher returns.  Barber and 
Odean examine the trading records of individual stock investors and report that frequent trading 
substantially depresses investment returns.  Similar factors, such as education of advisors, cash only 
programs versus futures and options programs, frequency of futures and options trading, or storage costs, 
may be useful in predicting the performance of market advisory programs.  
 
 
Summary and Conclusions 
  The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the pricing performance of market advisory services for the 
1995-2000 corn and soybean crops.  A new database on market advisory service recommendations from 
the Agricultural Market Advisory Services (AgMAS) Project at the University of Illinois at Urbana-
Champaign is used.  The AgMAS Project subscribes to all of the services that are followed and records 
recommendations on a real-time basis, which should prevent pricing performance results from being   25
subject to survivorship or hindsight bias.  Explicit marketing assumptions are made to produce a 
consistent and comparable set of results across different advisory programs.  Based on these assumptions, 
the net price received by a subscriber to a market advisory program is calculated for the 1995-2000 corn 
and soybean crops.  Since many subscribers to market advisory services produce both corn and soybeans, 
per acre revenue also is computed.  Both market and farmer benchmarks are developed for the 
evaluations.  The benchmarks are computed using the same assumptions as those applied to advisory 
service track records. 
  Three basic tests of performance are examined for advisory program prices and revenues over 
1995-2000.  The first test compares the average price or revenue of advisory programs to benchmarks.  
Average differences from market benchmarks for corn over 1995-2000 are small, ranging from one to 
three cents per bushel.
25  At 11¢ cents per bushel, the average difference from the farmer benchmark for 
corn is larger.  Average differences versus the market benchmarks for soybeans are larger than for corn, 
ranging from 13 to 17¢ per bushel.  The average difference versus the farmer benchmark in soybeans 
equals 23¢ per bushel.  Average differences for 50/50 advisory revenue range from three to seven dollars 
per acre for market benchmarks over 1995-2000.  The average revenue difference versus the farmer 
benchmark is $14 per acre.  Statistical tests indicate no evidence of significant average price performance 
in corn versus market benchmarks, mixed evidence of significant performance in soybeans versus market 
benchmarks, mixed evidence for advisory revenue versus market benchmarks and consistent evidence of 
significant performance in corn, soybeans and advisory revenue versus the farmer benchmark. 
    The second test is the average price and risk of advisory programs relative to benchmarks.  Only a 
few programs (6 to 12%) exhibit mean-standard deviation dominance of the 24-month market benchmark 
in corn, soybeans or revenue.  More programs (35 to 53%) dominate the 20-month market benchmark.  
The strongest evidence is found versus the farmer benchmark, where a relatively large number of 
programs (41 to 76%) dominate.  Statistical tests show that very few of the dominant cases are significant, 
which is not a major surprise given that the tests for mean-standard deviation dominance are applied to   26
individual programs using only six observations.  Overall, these results show that consideration of risk 
tends to weaken evidence regarding the pricing performance of advisory programs. 
The third test is the predictability of advisory program performance from year-to-year.  “Winner” 
and “loser” predictability results are similar for corn, soybeans and advisory revenue.  The conditional 
probability of a winner (top half of programs) repeating averages 57% and the conditional probability of a 
loser (bottom half of programs) repeating averages 60%.  These probabilities are only slighter higher than 
what would result from flipping a coin (randomness) and provide scant evidence that pricing performance 
for all advisory programs can be predicted from past performance.  The performance of top- and bottom-
performing programs does not appear to be predictable in a useful sense either.  For example, 
comparisons of non-overlapping crop years show that programs in the top fourth beat the bottom fourth 
only by an average of 1¢ per bushel in corn, 14¢ per bushel in soybeans and $1 per acre for 50/50 
advisory revenue. 
Overall, the results provide an interesting picture of the performance of market advisory programs 
in corn and soybeans.  There is limited evidence that advisory programs as a group outperform market 
benchmarks, particularly after considering risk.  This supports the view that grain markets (cash, futures 
and options) are efficient with respect to the types of marketing strategies available to farmers (e.g., 
Zulauf and Irwin) over the view that grain markets are inefficient and provide substantial opportunities 
for farmers to gain additional profits through marketing (e.g., Wisner, Blue and Baldwin).   Market 
advisory services (as a group) appear to have limited access to information not available to other market 
participants and/or mildly superior analytical skills.  In addition, there is little evidence that advisory 
programs with superior performance can be usefully selected based on past performance.  
While these conclusions run counter to the performance claims of advisory services, some 
evidence is found that advisory programs outperform the farmer benchmark, even after taking risk into 
account.  This raises the intriguing possibility that even though advisory services do not “beat the 
market,” they nonetheless provide an opportunity for farmers to improve marketing performance because   27
farmers under-perform the market.  Mirroring debates about stock investing, the relevant issue is then 
whether farmers can most effectively improve marketing performance by pursuing “active” strategies, 
like those recommended by advisory services, or “passive” strategies, which involve routinely spreading 
sales across the marketing window.  Recently, a number of grain companies began offering “averaging” 
or “indexing” contracts that allow farmers to easily implement a passive approach to marketing (Smith, 
2001).  The rising interest in these “new generation” marketing contracts suggests the potential for 
historic changes in farmers’ approach to grain marketing.  Future research that aids farmers, educators and 
policy-makers in better understanding the costs and benefits of active versus passive approaches to 
marketing will be especially valuable.    28
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Endnotes 
 
1 Farmers subscribe to market advisory programs for a variety of reasons, including specific pricing 
recommendations, information, networking, education, marketing expertise, rational decision-making, 
diversification, and assistance with farm program decisions (Williams). 
  
2 It appears that many farmers believe this assertion about their marketing performance.  For example, 77% of the 
participants at a University of Illinois extension program held in December 2000 agreed with the statement that ”On 
average, corn and soybean producers sell two-thirds of their crops in the bottom one-third of the price range.” 
  
3 Several related studies have been published.  In an early and remarkable study, Marquardt and McGann evaluate 
10 private and public outlook newsletters.  This study investigates the accuracy of cash price predictions for the 
newsletters in corn, soybeans, wheat, cattle and hogs over 1970-1973, and finds that futures prices generally were a 
more accurate source of forecasts than the newsletters.  King, Lev and Nefstad examine the corn and soybean 
recommendations of two market advisory services for a single year.  The focus of their study is not pricing 
performance, but a demonstration of the market accounting program Market Tools.  Kastens and Schroeder examine 
futures trading profits based on the advisory service information reported in Top Producer magazine for the 1988-
1996 crop years.  They find negative trading profits for wheat and positive trading profits for corn and soybeans. 
 
4 Throughout this report, the term "crop year" refers to the marketing window for a particular crop.  This is done to 
simplify the presentation and discussion of market advisory service performance results.  A “crop year” is more than 
twelve calendar months in length and includes pre-harvest and post-harvest marketing periods.  
 
5 The term “advisory program” will be used throughout the remainder of this paper because several advisory 
services have more than one distinct marketing program.  This typically takes the form of one set of advice for 
farmers who are willing to use futures and options (although futures and options are not always used), and a 
separate set of advice for farmers who only wish to make cash sales.  In this situation, both strategies are recorded 
and treated as distinct programs to be evaluated. 
 
6 The definition of delta is the dollar amount that the value of a position changes for a one unit increase in the price 
of the underlying commodity. 
 
7 A detailed explanation of the construction of marketing profiles and the full set of results for individual advisory 
programs and crop years can be found in Martines-Filho et al. (2002a, 2002b).  
  
8 Farmers and other market observers are familiar with the idea that advisory programs have different “marketing 
styles.”  For example, Williams identifies the marketing styles of five prominent advisors, labeled somewhat 
colorfully, as The Banker, The Race Car Driver, The Astronaut, The Sprinter and the Insurance Agent. 
 
9 Weaker versions of the theory of efficient markets predict advisory services may profit to the degree they have 
superior access to information and/or superior analytical ability (e.g., Zulauf and Irwin).  While logically appealing, 
it is quite difficult, if not impossible, to specify market benchmarks based on weaker versions of the theory because 
it requires knowledge of the average access to information and analytical ability of market participants. 
 
10 The table shows that the number of programs included each crop year does not vary substantially.  However, this 
does not necessarily imply that the same programs are included each crop year, as eight programs exited and ten 
programs entered the sample over the six crop years. 
 
11 The normality test results are available from the authors upon request. 
 
12 Assume 25 advisory programs are included in each crop year over 1995-2000.  Then, a total of 300 pair-wise 
correlation coefficients would have to be estimated.  However, the sample only contains 150 observations.  There 
simply is not enough information (degrees of freedom) to estimate each correlation independently. 
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13 The full set of regression results is available from the authors upon request. 
 
14 Differences are calculated as advisory price minus benchmark price.  So, a positive difference indicates an 
advisory price above the benchmark price, and vice versa. 
 
15 Since there is some evidence of non-normality, a non-parametric test of mean equivalence also is applied to the 
differences for an average advisory program shown in Table 3.  Given that the data are paired, the appropriate non-
parametric test is the Wilcoxon signed rank test (Conover).  The same hypothesis test conclusions are reached based 
on the Wilcoxon test as the t-test.  These results are available from the authors upon request. 
 
16  Pooled time-trend regressions are estimated across the six crop years the 1995-2000 crop years.  The slope 
estimate for corn is -2.44¢ per month and the associated t-statistic is -3.44.  The slope estimate for soybeans is -
2.85¢ per month and the associated t-statistic is -2.97.  While it is probably inappropriate to assume that futures 
prices follow a trend stationary process (e.g., Zulauf et al.), the regressions provide a simple means of illustrating 
the large magnitude of the average trend in corn and soybean prices over the 24-month marketing window.  
 
17 Standard deviation is substituted for variance as an estimate of risk because it easier to understand.  Performance 
results are the same whether standard deviation or variance is used to estimate risk (Hardaker, Huirne and 
Anderson, p.143), hence the use of the simpler measure.  
 
18 The restriction means that only advisory programs active all six crop years are included in the average price and 
risk evaluation.  As a result, there is the potential for survivorship bias in the average price and risk comparisons to 
the benchmarks.  Survivorship bias in the average estimates appears to be non-existent, as the average prices and 
average revenue for the 17 programs are actually less than the average prices and revenue computed across all 
advisory programs active in the 1995-2000 sample period.  It is quite difficult to assess the degree of survivorship 
bias in advisory program standard deviation estimates with the limited number of crop years available. 
 
19 It is possible to conduct separate mean and standard deviation tests for a randomly-selected program and then 
combine the results based on a bounds condition (Collender).  However, such procedures ignore the paired nature of 
advisory program and benchmark data, which would lead to tests with little or no power to reject the null hypothesis 
(Snedecor and Cochrane, p. 101). 
  
20 Jarque-Bera tests indicate that normality of net advisory prices is rejected for one crop year in corn and three in 
soybeans.  Like the t-test, the F-test can be justified as a conservative and reliable approximation in cases where 
normality is rejected (Greene, p. 108). 
 
21 The tests presented in this section do not consider predictability of risk-adjusted performance measures.  The six-
year sample period is not long enough to estimate risk-adjusted performance during sub-periods, which is required 
for predictability tests. 
 
22 Fisher’s Exact Test is the appropriate statistical test because both row and column totals are pre-determined in the 
2 x 2 contingency table formed on the basis of winner and loser counts. 
 
23 Pooled test results are not reported because Fisher’s Exact Test assumes sample observations are independent.  As 
discussed in the section on average price performance, this clearly is not the case, and therefore, the p-values for 
such tests would overstate the true significance of the results. 
 
24 These results are available from the authors upon request. 
 
25 Differences are calculated as advisory price minus benchmark price.  So, a positive difference indicates an 
advisory price above the benchmark price, and vice versa. Number of 24-Month 20-Month 24-Month 20-Month
Crop Year Programs Minimum Maximum Average Market Market Farmer Market Market Farmer 
Panel A: Corn
1995 25 2.29 3.90 3.03 2.90 3.07 3.06 76 56 56
1996 26 2.08 3.12 2.63 2.65 2.66 2.50 38 38 73
1997 25 2.00 2.74 2.32 2.33 2.27 2.23 52 64 68
1998 23 1.93 2.51 2.17 2.24 2.12 1.97 30 52 91
1999 26 1.66 2.49 2.02 2.05 1.97 1.93 54 69 77
2000 28 1.79 2.78 2.13 2.09 2.01 1.95 56 74 78
  1995-2000 Average 2.38 2.38 2.35 2.28 51 59 74
Panel B: Soybeans
1995 25 5.66 7.94 6.59 6.26 6.39 6.59 84 72 52
1996 24 6.80 7.80 7.27 7.08 7.21 7.17 83 58 71
1997 23 6.06 6.99 6.38 6.30 6.22 6.17 57 65 74
1998 22 5.11 6.58 5.82 5.86 5.64 5.18 32 77 95
1999 25 4.68 7.10 5.67 5.50 5.30 5.39 60 96 88
2000 27 5.00 6.83 5.45 5.42 5.38 5.29 46 54 65
  1995-2000 Average 6.19 6.07 6.02 5.97 61 70 74
Panel C: 50/50 Revenue
1995 25 255 382 319 304 317 320 76 60 56
1996 24 327 407 369 366 371 357 67 54 79
1997 23 283 354 311 310 304 300 57 70 70
1998 22 282 340 304 311 296 274 27 64 100
1999 25 266 371 299 297 286 285 52 80 80
2000 27 265 381 298 293 286 279 58 69 81
  1995-2000 Average 316 313 310 303 57 66 77
Notes:  Net advisory prices and benchmark prices are stated on a harvest equivalent basis. A crop year is a two-year marketing window from September of the year previous to harvest through August of the year after 
harvest. Averages for 1995-2000 are computed over the full set of advisory programs. As a result, averages of individual crop year prices, revenues or proportions may not equal the averages reported for 1995-2000.
---percent---
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for Net Advisory Prices, Revenues and Benchmarks for Corn and Soybeans, 1995 - 2000 Crop Years
Net Advisory Price or Revnue Proportion of Programs Above Benchmark Benchmark Price or Revenue
---$ per bushel (harvest equivalent)--- ---$ per bushel (harvest equivalent)---
---$ per acre (harvest equivalent)--- ---$ per acre (harvest equivalent)--- ---percent---
---$ per bushel (harvest equivalent)--- ---$ per bushel (harvest equivalent)--- ---percent---
 34Commodity/ Average Two-tail
Benchmark 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Difference t-statistic p-value
Corn
    24-Month Market Average  14 -2 -1 -8 -3 4 1 0.21 0.88
    20-Month Market Average  -4 -4 5 5 5 11 3 1.28 0.26
    Farmer -3 12 9 20 9 18 11 3.33 0.02
Soybeans
    24-Month Market Average  33 19 9 -4 18 2 13 2.34 0.07
    20-Month Market Average  20 6 16 18 37 7 17 3.68 0.01
    Farmer 1 10 21 64 28 15 23 2.56 0.05
50/50 Revenue
    24-Month Market Average  15 2 1 -6 2 4 3 1.04 0.35
    20-Month Market Average  2 -2 7 8 13 11 7 2.86 0.04
    Farmer -1 11 11 30 14 18 14 3.26 0.02
Table 2. Average Pricing Performance Results for Market Advisory Programs, Corn, Soybeans and 50/50 Advisory 
Revenue, 1995 - 2000 Crop Years
Difference Between Average Advisory Program and Benchmark
Notes:  Two stars indicates significance at the one percent level and one star indicates significance at the five percent level (based on the t-
---¢ per bushel (harvest equivalent)---
---$ per acre (harvest equivalent)---






 35Unadjusted Futures & Net
Commodity/Advisory Program Cash Sales Physical Net Cash Options Brokerage LDP / Advisory
and Benchmark Price Storage Shrinkage  Interest Sales Price Gain Costs MLG Price
Panel A: Average Price Components
Corn
    Advisory Programs 2.46 0.11 0.03 0.05 2.27 0.01 0.02 0.12 2.38
    24-Month Market Benchmark 2.42 0.08 0.02 0.04 2.27 0.00 0.00 0.11 2.38
    20-Month Market Benchmark 2.43 0.10 0.03 0.05 2.26 0.00 0.00 0.10 2.35
    Farmer Benchmark 2.41 0.15 0.04 0.07 2.15 0.00 0.00 0.12 2.28
Soybeans
    Advisory Programs 6.00 0.11 0.00 0.12 5.77 0.05 0.02 0.39 6.20
    24-Month Market Benchmark 5.88 0.08 0.00 0.10 5.70 0.00 0.00 0.37 6.07
    20-Month Market Benchmark 5.87 0.10 0.00 0.12 5.66 0.00 0.00 0.36 6.02
    Farmer Benchmark 5.90 0.14 0.00 0.17 5.59 0.00 0.00 0.38 5.97
Panel B: Average Difference in Price Components
Corn
  Advisory Programs - 24-Month Benchmark 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01
  Advisory Programs - 20-Month Benchmark 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03
  Advisory Programs - Farmer Benchmark 0.05 -0.04 -0.01 -0.02 0.12 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.11
Soybeans
  Advisory Programs - 24-Month Benchmark 0.11 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.07 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.13
  Advisory Programs - 20-Month Benchmark 0.12 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.17
  Advisory Programs - Farmer Benchmark 0.10 -0.03 0.00 -0.05 0.18 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.23
Commercial Storage Costs
Table 3.  Average Pricing Performance Results for Market Advisory Programs by Underlying Components, Corn and Soybeans, 1995 - 
2000 Crop Years
Notes:  Net cash sales price is calculated as unadjusted cash sales price minus commercial storage costs. Net advisory price is calculated as net cash sales price plus 
futures and options gains minus brokerage costs plus LDP/MLG, and therefore, is stated on a harvest equivalent basis. Market and farmer benchmark prices also are 
stated on a harvest equivalent basis. LDP stands for loan deficiency payment and MLG stands for marketing loan gain. LDP/MLGs were not paid for the 1995 - 1997 
1995 - 2000 Average
---$ per bushel---
 36Standard Standard
Average Deviation Average Deviation Standard
Net of  Net Net of  Net Deviation 
Advisory Advisory Advisory Advisory Average of
Market Advisory Program Price Price Price Price Revenue Revenue
1 2.39 0.29 5.86 1.03 310 38
2 2.43 0.40 6.14 0.77 319 29
3 2.76 0.67 6.80 0.41 358 43
4 2.42 0.65 6.45 0.98 324 43
5 2.53 0.45 6.06 0.74 324 32
6 2.39 0.41 6.16 0.86 316 30
7 2.36 0.26 6.03 0.69 312 27
8 2.36 0.34 6.14 0.85 314 31
9 2.30 0.18 6.23 0.65 313 20
10 2.33 0.33 6.06 0.69 310 33
11 2.34 0.20 6.31 0.66 318 35
12 2.35 0.46 6.05 0.67 311 39
13 2.27 0.54 6.14 0.77 306 38
14 2.29 0.51 6.33 0.73 312 38
15 2.20 0.41 6.25 0.63 304 29
16 2.35 0.39 6.06 0.69 311 32
17 2.39 0.41 6.24 0.35 319 17
  Average 2.38 0.41 6.19 0.72 316 33
  Minimum 2.20 0.18 5.86 0.35 304 17
  Maximum 2.76 0.67 6.80 1.03 358 43
  Range 0.57 0.49 0.93 0.67 54 26
Benchmarks
  24-Month Market Average 2.38 0.33 6.07 0.62 313 27
  20-Month Market Average 2.35 0.43 6.02 0.73 310 32
  Farmer 2.28 0.44 5.97 0.81 303 32
Table 4.  Six-Year Average and Standard Deviation for 17 Market Advisory Programs, Corn and Soybean Net Advisory 
Prices and 50/50 Advisory Revenues, 1995 - 2000 Crop Years
Note: Results are shown only for the 17 advisory programs included in all six years of the AgMAS corn and soybean evaluations. Net advisory prices 
and benchmark prices are stated on a harvest equivalent basis. Consequently, 50/50 advisory and benchmark revenue are also stated on a harvest 
equivalent basis. A crop year is a two-year window from September of the year previous to harvest through August of the year after harvest. 
Corn Soybeans 50/50 Advisory Revenue
---$ per bushel (harvest equivalent)--- ---$ per bushel (harvest equivalent)--- ---$ per acre (harvest equivalent)---
 3724-Month 20-Month 24-Month 20-Month 24-Month 20-Month
Market Advisory Program Market Market Farmer Market Market Farmer Market Market Farmer
1 +++ - - - -??
2 ?++ ??+ ?++
3 ??? +++ ???
4 ??? ??? ???
5 ??? -?+ ???
6 ?++ ??? ?++
7 ?++ -++ -++
8 -++ ??? ?++
9 ??+ ?++ ?++
10 ? ? + - + + - ? ?
1 1 ??+ ?++ ???
1 2 -?? -++ -??
1 3 --- ??+ -??
14 - - ? ? ? + - ? ?
15 - ? ? ? + + - + +
1 6 -?+ -++ -??
1 7 ?++ +++ +++
        Total Count
+ 1 61 0 2 91 3 1 7 7
? 1 0 96 973 8 1 0 1 0
- 621 611 800
Table 5.  Mean-Standard Deviation Dominance Results for 17 Market Advisory Programs, Corn and Soybean Net Advisory 
Price and 50/50 Advisory Revenue, 1995 - 2000 Crop Years
Note:  A "+" indicates the average price for an advisory program is higher than the given benchmark and the standard deviation for the program is lower than 
the given benchmark.  In this case, the advisory program exhibits mean-standard deviation dominance of the given benchmark.  A "?" indicates the average 
price for an advisory program is higher (lower) than the given benchmark and the standard deviation for the program is higher (lower) than the given 
benchmark.  In this case, the advisory program does not exhibit mean-standard deviation dominance of the given benchmark, and vice versa .  A "-" indicates 
the average price for an advisory program is lower than the given benchmark and the standard deviation for the program is higher than the given benchmark.  
In this case, the given benchmark exhibits mean-standard deviation dominance of the advisory program. Two stars indicates statistically significant dominance 
at the one percent level and one star indicates significant dominance at the five percent level.
Dominance in Corn  Dominance in Soybeans  Dominance in 50/50 Revenue 












 38Two-tail Two-tail Two-tail 
p-value p-value p-value
Year  Year  Winner Loser for  Fisher's  Winner Loser for  Fisher's  Winner Loser for  Fisher's 
    t   t+1 t+1 t+1 Exact Test t+1 t+1 Exact Test t+1 t+1 Exact Test
1995 1996 Winner t 56 Winner t 65 Winner t 74
Loser t 6 5 1.00 Loser t 5 6 1.00 Loser t 4 7 0.39
1996 1997 Winner t 75 Winner t 65 Winner t 65
Loser t 5 7 0.68 Loser t 5 6 1.00 Loser t 5 6 1.00
1997 1998 Winner t 65 Winner t 64 Winner t 37
Loser t 5 7 0.68 Loser t 4 7 0.39 Loser t 7 4 0.20
1998 1999 Winner t 74 Winner t 73 Winner t 64
Loser t 4 7 0.39 Loser t 3 8 0.09 Loser t 4 7 0.39
1999 2000 Winner t 84 Winner t 84 Winner t 93
Loser t 4 9 0.12 Loser t 4 8 0.22 Loser t 3 9 0.04
Table 6.  Performance Predictability Results Based on Winner and Loser Categories Between Pairs of Adjacent Crop Years, Corn, Soybeans and 50/50 Revenue, 1995-2000 
Crop Years
Soybeans
Note: The selection strategy consists of ranking programs by net advisory price in the first year of the pair (e.g.,  t = 1995) and then forming two groups of programs: "winners" are those services in the top half of the 
rankings and "losers" are services in the bottom half.  Next, the same programs are ranked by net advisory price for the second year of the pair (e.g.,  t+1 = 1996), and again divided into "winners" and "losers."  For a 
given comparison, advisory programs must fall in one of the following categories: winner  t-winner t+1, winner t-loser t+1, loser t-winner t+1, loser t-loser t+1.  If advisory program performance is unpredictable, 
approximately the same counts will be found in each of the four combinations.  Fisher’s Exact Test is the appropriate statistical test of no predictability because both row and column totals are pre-determined in the 2 
x 2 contingency table formed on the basis of winner and loser counts. Two stars indicates significance at the one percent level and one star indicates significance at the five percent level.
Corn 50/50 Revenue
---number of programs--- ---number of programs--- ---number of programs---
*
 39Average Average Average Average Average Average
Performance Quantile Price Price Price Price Revenue Revenue
 in Year t in Year t in Year t+1 in Year t in Year t+1 in Year t in Year t+1
Top Third 2.65 2.32 6.72 6.29 341 324
Middle Third 2.46 2.27 6.32 6.04 321 313
Bottom Third 2.23 2.18 6.05 6.00 302 310
  Top Third minus Bottom Third
          Average 0.42 0.14 0.68 0.29 38 14
          t-statistic N/A 3.85 N/A 2.28 N/A 2.85
         Two-tail p-value N/A 0.02 N/A 0.09 N/A 0.05
Top Fourth 2.70 2.36 6.81 6.34 346 327
Second Fourth 2.50 2.26 6.42 6.09 325 315
Third Fourth 2.41 2.24 6.25 6.07 318 313
Bottom Fourth 2.19 2.17 6.01 5.95 299 309
  Top Fourth minus Bottom Fourth
          Average 0.31 0.19 0.41 0.39 26 18
          t-statistic N/A 4.04 N/A 2.24 N/A 2.76
        Two-tail  p-value N/A 0.02 N/A 0.09 N/A 0.05
Note:  The selection strategy consists of sorting programs by net advisory price in the first  year of the pair (e.g., t = 1995) and grouping programs by quantiles (thirds 
and fourths).  Next, the average net advisory price for each quantile is computed for the first year of the pair. Then, the average net advisory price of the quantiles 
formed in the first year is computed for the second year of the pair (e.g., t+1 = 1996).  Next, the average net advisory price for the second year is averaged across the 
comparisons. There are a total of five comparisons (1995 vs. 1996, 1996 vs. 1997, 1997 vs. 1998, 19998 vs. 1999 and 1999 vs. 2000), so there are four degrees of 
freedom for the t-test. Some average differences of the quantiles may not equal the difference of the averages for the quantiles due to rounding.Two stars indicates 
significance at the one percent level and one star indicates significance at the five percent level
Table 7.  Performance Predictability Results Based on Quantiles Between Pairs of Adjacent Crop Years, Corn, Soybeans and 50/50 
Revenue, 1995-2000 Crop Years
Corn Soybeans 50/50 Revenue
---$ per bushel (harvest equivalent)--- ---$ per bushel (harvest equivalent)--- ---$ per acre (harvest equivalent)---
* *
* *
 40Average Average Average Average Average Average
Performance Quantile Price Price Price Price Revenue Revenue
 in Year t in Year t in Year t+2 in Year t in Year t+2 in Year t in Year t+2
Top Third 2.76 2.17 6.88 5.97 346 308
Middle Third 2.55 2.16 6.50 5.75 327 295
Bottom Third 2.32 2.13 6.23 5.76 307 304
  Top Third minus Bottom Third
          Average 0.45 0.03 0.65 0.21 39 5
          t-statistic N/A 0.41 N/A 1.04 N/A 0.44
         Two-tail p-value N/A 0.72 N/A 0.41 N/A 0.70
Top Fourth 2.81 2.18 6.94 5.97 350 310
Second Fourth 2.60 2.19 6.58 5.81 330 296
Third Fourth 2.50 2.08 6.42 5.68 322 294
Bottom Fourth 2.28 2.17 6.19 5.82 303 308
  Top Fourth minus Bottom Fourth
          Average 0.53 0.01 0.75 0.14 46 1
          t-statistic N/A 0.11 N/A 0.77 N/A 0.17
        Two-tail  p-value N/A 0.92 N/A 0.52 N/A 0.88
Note:  The selection strategy consists of sorting programs by net advisory price in the first  year of the pair (e.g., t = 1995) and grouping programs by quantiles (thirds 
and fourths).  Next, the average net advisory price for each quantile is computed for the first year of the pair. Then, the average net advisory price of the quantiles formed
in the first year is computed for the second year of the pair (e.g., t+2 = 1997).  Next, the average net advisory price for the second year is averaged across the 
comparisons. There are a total of four comparisons (1995 vs. 1997, 1996 vs. 1998, 1997 vs. 1999, and 1998 vs. 2000), so there are three degrees of freedom for the t-
test. Some average differences of the quantiles may not equal the difference of the averages for the quantiles due to rounding.Two stars indicates significance at the one 
percent level and one star indicates significance at the five percent level
Table 8.  Performance Predictability Results Based on Quantiles Between Pairs of Non-Overlapping Crop Years, Corn, Soybeans and 
50/50 Revenue, 1995-2000 Crop Years
Corn Soybeans 50/50 Revenue
---$ per bushel (harvest equivalent)--- ---$ per bushel (harvest equivalent)--- ---$ per acre (harvest equivalent)---
 41Panel A: Conservative Program
Panel B: Aggressive Program
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